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Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

Recent Cases
INJURED CONSUMER
PREVAILS IN STRICT
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
ACTION DESPITE
MANUFACTURER'S
PRODUCT WARNING
The United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit held
that the manufacturer of a defective power sweeper was strictly
liable for the consumer's injuries.
In Austin v. Lincoln Equipment
Assoc., Inc., 888 F.2d 934 (1st Cir.
1989), the court found that the
sweeper's operator had established
a prima facie case that the power
sweeper was unreasonably dangerous. The court held that the operator had neither assumed the risk of
using the sweeper nor misused it,
despite his failure to heed the
warning label.
Background
On the date of the accident,
Otis Austin ("Austin") used a power sweeper manufactured by Garlock Equipment Company ("Garlock") to sweep a flat rooftop in
Providence, Rhode Island. As an
employee for a roofing company,
Austin's job was to sweep gravel
into rows so that other employees
could remove the gravel with handbrooms and shovels. After partially
completing the job, Austin stopped
the sweeper approximately two to
five feet from the roof's edge,
despite the warning label on the
sweeper which read, "CAUTION!
DO NOT OPERATE WITHIN
TEN FEET OF EDGE OF
ROOF." When Austin restarted
the machine, it bucked backwards
against him; he fell off the roof and
suffered severe injuries. Austin
sued both Garlock and the seller of
the machine, Lincoln Equipment
Associates, Inc. ("Lincoln"),
claiming that the machine was defective. He claimed that the sweeper's brush and wheel clutch failed
to engage properly due to a poorly
designed interlock mechanism.
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The U.S. District Court's Decision
At trial before the United
States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, Garlock
moved for a directed verdict; the
motion was denied. At the close of
trial, the court submitted special
interrogatories to the jury. In response, the jury found Garlock
strictly liable, but it found Lincoln
not liable. The jury further found
that Austin had not assumed the
risk of injury by operating the
machine within ten feet of the roof
edge. However, the jury found that
Austin was 60% negligent. Taking
Austin's negligence into account,
the jury awarded him $160,000.
Garlock did not object to the verdict before the jury was dismissed.
Nine days after trial, Garlock
moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the grounds
that it was not liable as a matter of
law. Garlock alternatively moved
for a new trial on the grounds that
the jury had reached inconsistent
verdicts for Lincoln and Garlock.
The district court denied the motions. Garlock appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit, raising both issues on which the district court had
denied Garlock's motions.
Products Liability in Rhode Island
In 1971, Rhode Island adopted the theory of strict liability
found in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement"). Section 402A provides:
One who sells any product in
a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused
...if (a) the seller is engaged
in the business of selling such
a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user
or consumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold.
Restatement (Second) of Torts §

402A(l) (1965). This rule of strict
liability applies even if the seller
has exercised all possible care in
preparing and selling the product.
According to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court, strict liability attaches only if the defect renders the
product unsafe for its intended use
or if the manufacturer fails to warn
of any dangers posed by the product that are reasonably foreseeable
at the time of marketing.
"Consumer Expectation
Test." In strict products liability
cases, the injured party must prove
that the product is defective and
that the defect causd his injury.
Rhode Island courts employ a
"consumer expectation test" to determine whether a product is defective under the strict liability
definition. This standard protects
consumers who may be unaware of
the dangers posed by using a product as it was intended to be used.
Under this standard, a defect renders a product "unreasonably dangerous" if it creates a strong likelihood that the user will be injured.
A manufacturer's failure to warn
consumers of a foreseeable, unreasonable danger inherent in its
product is grounds for strict products liability. However, in strict
products liability cases, Rhode Island courts determine the manufacturer's and the consumer's relative liability for the consumer's
injuries by considering the parties'
comparative negligence, and allow
a complete defense to the manufactuer if the consumer assumed the
risk of operating the product.
The First Circuit's Opinion
Austin's Prima Facie Case.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit initially
assessed whether Austin had established a prima facie case by producing enough evidence at trial to
support the jury's verdict. The
court found that the evidence was
sufficient to show Garlock's sweeper was unreasonably dangerous.
The sweeper's interlock mechanism was meant to ensure that the
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brush and wheel clutches simultaneously engaged, preventing any
backward thrust. Austin's expert
witness testified that a poorly designed interlock mechanism
caused the machine's sudden backward motion. The court concluded
that the interlock mechanism
could reasonably be construed as a
defect under the strict liability definition. The court further found
that the machine's bucking motion
could reasonably be construed to
have caused Austin's injury. Thus,
the court found that Austin had
presented to the trial court a prima
facie case sufficient to justify the
jury's verdict.
Assumption of Risk. Garlock
contended that the assumption of
risk defense barred any liability
and, therefore, required a judgment in its favor as a matter of law.
This contention, if accepted,
would relieve Garlock of liability.
To establish an assumption of risk
defense, Garlock had to prove that
Austin was aware of the specific
risk that the machine might knock
him backwards, appreciated the
magnitude of the risk, and voluntarily exposed himself to the danger. The appellate court noted that
Austin was an experienced roofer
who appreciated the inherent danger of working on rooftops. He
frequently had worked with the
sweeper and knew it exerted "some
backward pressure" each time he
started it. However, Austin testified that he did not realize the
sweeper could jump back in the
way it had on this occasion, and
that he had neither read the warning label nor received any instructions on operating safety. On the
strenghth of Austin's testimony,
the appellate court found that the
trial court properly denied the motion for directed verdict based on
assumption of risk.
"Carelessness" Not the Same
as "Misuse." Next, Garlock contended that Austin had misused
the machine. A product is not
considered defective if the consumer's misuse caused the injury.
According to Garlock, by using the
sweeper within two to five feet of
the roof s edge, despite the displayed warning label proscribing
operating the machine within ten
feet of a roof s edge, Austin had
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misused the product. The appellate
court found that Austin had not
misused the sweeper. Misuse is
using the product for a purpose not
intended or foreseen by the manufacturer. The purpose of the sweeper was to sweep gravel, the exact
task for which Austin employed it.
The court stated that "careless"
use of a product for its intended
purpose is not the same as misuse.
Garlock also argued that Austin's use of the sweeper in a manner contrary to the warning was
tantamount to misuse. The court
held that a warning negates strict
liability only if following the warning would have abated the danger.
In this case, although Austin's use
of the sweeper near the roof s edge
compounded the danger, Garlock
was still strictly liable because the
sweeper was dangerous even if the
warning had been heeded. The
court stated, "[i]f a product is
unsafe regardless of whether the
user has followed the manufacturer's warning, the user's careless
failure to do so is simply contributory negligence." Accordingly, the
appellate court agreed with the
trial court's denial of Garlock's
motion for directed verdict based
on a misuse theory.
Manufacturer Waived Objection to Inconsistent Verdict. Garlock lastly contended that the jury
verdicts against it, as manufacturer, but for Lincoln, as seller, were
inconsistent and required a new
trial. The court agreed that, absent
special circumstances not present
in this case, if the manufacturer of
a product is found strictly liable,
the seller also is liable. The court
declined to consider the issue,
however, because Garlock had not
raised the objection in a timely
fashion. According to the court, a
party waives an inconsistent verdict objection if the objection is
not raised before the jury is dismissed. Garlock failed to raise the
objection until nine days after the
trial. Thus, the court considered
the objection waived.
Mark A. Myhra

ADVERTISEMENTS
FALSELY ALLEGING
"PERMANENT HAIR
REMOVAL" VIOLATED
THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION ACT
In Removatron International
Corporation v. Federal Trade Com-

mission, 884 F.2d 1489 (1st Cir.
1989), the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit held
that deceptively advertising a hair
removal machine violated section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act"), 15 U.S.C. §
45. Additionally, the court granted
the government's motion to prohibit continued advertising in order to prevent future economic
harm to potential purchasers of the
machine.
Factual Background
Removatron International
Corporation ("Removatron") and
Frederick E. Goodman marketed a
hair removal machine, or epilator,
which used tweezers combined
with a burst of radio frequency
energy ("RFE") to destroy hair
follicles, thereby removing unwanted body hair. The Federal
Communications Commission
("FCC") approved Removatron's
machine to emit RFE at a particular frequency. Removatron advertised that the machine permanently removed hair. Removatron's
advertisements asserted that the
epilator was "clinically tested,"
that the machine (rather than its
RFE) was approved by the FCC,
and that the RFE completely destroyed hair follicles by heating the
surrounding tissue.
Removatron advertised its
machine mainly in beauty industry
trade magazines. Salons usually
purchased the machine for
$4,000.00, and charged individual
customers $35.00 per one hour
treatment. Removatron instructed
the purchaser that several treatments were required in order to
obtain permanent hair removal
and that such treatments might not
work for everyone. Machine owners and operators in turn communicated the same information in
(continued on page 82)
81

